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Human Rights and Development in Africa: moral intrusion or empowering 
opportunity? 
 
Giles Mohan and Jeremy Holland 
 
Abstract 
Throughout the 1990s the debates about human rights and development have increasingly 
converged.  The article asks whether the emerging human rights-based approach to 
development, honed in the period of revisionist neo-liberalism, can deliver meaningful 
improvements to the African crisis?  It begins by outlining the evolution of the rights-based 
development agenda in order to understand how the present agenda is defined.  The next section 
examines the theoretical underpinnings of the current rights-based development agenda and 
summarises two recent reports which place such concerns at their centre.  From there we 
examine the implementation of rights-based procedures in Africa.  The next section assesses the 
moral and practical implications of the rights agenda for Africa and we conclude by arguing that 
the emphasis on economic and developmental rights should be welcomed, because it raises the 
possibility of cementing the right to a decent standard of living.  However, the potential exists for 
the rights-based agenda to be used as a new form of conditionality which usurps national 
sovereignty and by handing the responsibility for defending rights to authoritarian states the 
process does little to challenge the power structures which may have precipitated rights' abuses 
in the first place.  Finally, the emphasis on universal rights, as defined through largely Western 
experiences, limits the relevance of rights to local circumstances and thereby effects another 
form of Eurocentric violence which seeks to normalise a self-serving social vision. Hence, only 
by embedding discussions of rights in the locally meaningful struggles that confront 
impoverished Africans and by promoting broader and direct participation which, crucially, 
promotes self-determination can  a rights agenda more thoroughly promote African development. 
   
Introduction 
 
"human rights are not, as has sometimes been argued, a reward of development.  Rather, they are 
critical to achieving it" (UNDP, 2000: iii). 
 
"human rights in the 1990s, to a greater extent than ever before, set a norm that regulates the 
relationship between state and society" (Sano, 2000: 741) 
 
"For many people living in the South, international human rights are understood increasingly as a 
set of values that support the expansion of global capital, exploitation and control" (Evans, 1997: 
92) 
 
Throughout the 1990s the debates about human rights and development have increasingly 
converged.  Previously, much of the debate around and practice of human rights was confined to 
the 'first generation' of human rights regarding personal or private rights; sometimes referred to 
as political rights.  These are essentially 'negative' rights in that a person's freedom should be 
protected from the actions of other individuals, groups or the state.  The struggle has been to 
enshrine these principles in law, such as a bill of rights, so that a person has the legal means with 
which to defend their freedom.  Such bourgeois ideals grew out of the American and French 
revolutions of the 18th Century as well as the liberalism of the Enlightenment.  Subsequently, 
demands have been made for more positive human rights regarding broader social justice, such 
as labour rights, and tangible welfare benefits, such as housing and health care.  Such rights, 
sometimes referred to as economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights, are more socially-defined, 
in that they carry an obligation for society-as-a-whole to ensure a minimum level of well-being 
for all.  Clearly, the two sets of rights may be incompatible, especially for those who see well-
being guaranteed through atomistic self-interest as opposed to communal or humanistic 
principles which emphasise equality.  So, the rights arena has been forged out of competing 
political struggles in specific social and historical circumstances (Shivji, 1999). 
 
Alongside these issues, the major development agencies have pursued a broad anti-poverty 
agenda, albeit one that is increasingly driven by a neo-liberal market logic.  In the post-war 
period, the international human rights process, led largely by the United Nations, has sought to 
promote the indivisibility of political rights and economic, social and cultural rights.  Since the 
early 1980s, the adjustment era has seen most Third World countries disciplined via debt 
conditionality with an emphasis on market-based development.  This reduced the scope of the 
state which has been actively reformed to support marketisation.  However, the impacts on 
poverty have been questionable so that some development agencies began to re-assert the need 
for welfare protection and a more active role for the state.   
 
It is here that the rights agenda has become more mainstream, because it places obligations on 
the state, amongst other actors, to ensure a minimum level of well-being for all.  This differs 
from the 'Basic Needs' of the 1970s, because the poor are encouraged to participate in defining 
and securing their welfare needs rather than being passive recipients of aid.  As DFID (2000: 1) 
asserts, human rights "provide a means of empowering all people to make decisions about their 
own lives rather than being the passive objects of choices made on their own behalf".  Two 
related issues arise here.  First, is that multilateral and bilateral donor interventions have often 
usurped sovereignty through debt leverage, so will an emphasis on universal human rights be 
used as another means of deepening control over developing countries?  Second, do the twin 
discourses of market hegemony and the universality of human rights involve an implicit erasure 
of cultural specificity and the denial of non-market alternatives to development? 
 
So, given that the human rights agenda has important implications for democracy and 
sovereignty, and that the donors are championing 'rights-based development' (RBD), it seems 
appropriate to discuss these in an issue on governance in Africa.  In this article we want to 
explore the question of whether the emerging human rights-based approach to development, 
honed in the period of revisionist neo-liberalism, can deliver meaningful improvements to the 
African crisis?  This article begins by outlining briefly the evolution of the rights-based 
development agenda from its Enlightenment roots to the present day in order to understand how 
the present agenda is defined.  This has seen the emphasis expand from a personal and civil focus 
to an international and 'developmental' one.  The next section examines the theoretical 
underpinnings of the current rights-based development agenda and goes on to summarise two 
recent reports which place such concerns at their centre.  From there we give an overview of the 
state of play of implementing rights-based procedures in Africa, as a whole, and in individual 
African countries.  The next section assesses the moral and practical implications of the rights 
agenda for Africa and assesses both the opportunities and threats it presents.  We conclude by 
suggesting the possible future for rights work in Africa and the research agenda attached to it. 
 
Evolution of the Rights-based Development Agenda 
The struggles for rights are rooted in the Enlightenment and the emergence of citizenship.  This 
saw the weakening of the monarch-subject relation and the movement away from particular to 
universal values.  The emphasis was on the individual within society which fed into the 
ascendant liberal philosophy of western politics.  The French and American revolutions of the 
18th Century saw rights enshrined in constitutional and legal terms, the most important being the 
American Bill of Rights of 1791.  These civil and political rights primarily benefited the 
bourgeoisie and protected them from over-bearing state interference on the one hand and the 
popular participation that a genuine commitment to social equality requires on the other.  Hence, 
as Ake (1987: 6) notes "(T)he idea of human rights really came into its own as a tool for 
opposing democracy".  Subsequent rights were more socially- and economically- oriented and 
related to the welfare agenda of the 20th Century whereby the working class could expect a 
minimum level of protection.  The most recent phases of rights have focussed on international 
solidarity through a social movements-led agenda around such issues as the environment and 
development.  Some have argued (Bobbio, 1996), that we are entering a further phase of genetic 
rights concerning the integrity of our basic biological identities.  The first two phases in the 
evolution of the rights agenda were largely confined to western democracies and concerned the 
relationship between the individual and the state.  With the growth of international governance, 
more Third World perspectives are being recognised (though not always incorporated into it) 
which is re-shaping the relationship between the individual and the global political order (Sano,  
2000).  Ake (1987) notes that with this evolution, the human rights agenda has become a little 
more relevant to the needs of Africans. 
 
Early debates around development and rights revolved around the political rights of people in 
colonised countries pushing for independence.  In Africa, as Mamdani (1996) has shown, 
citizenship originally applied to the urban areas where expatriate whites were free to pursue and 
receive a relatively wide range of civic rights denied to the colonised.  Some of these rights 
gradually spread to the African urban élites, but the rural areas were purposefully divided along 
and governed by customary laws.  It is this 'bifurcated state' structure, with its  distinction 
between 'rights' and 'customs' and the association of rights with colonially-derived privileges, 
that has led to scepticism and apathy by many Africans towards the promises of the 'rights 
agenda' (Penna and Campbell, 1998). 
 
Box 1: Milestones in Rights-based Development 
 
• American Bill of Rights (1791) 
• UN Declaration on Human Rights (1948) 
• The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) 
• Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) 
• The African Human Rights Commission (1987) 
• Vienna Conference on Human Rights (1993)  
• Copenhagen Conference on Social Development (1995)  
• South African Government's Bill of Rights and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995)  
• UNDP Human Development Report (2000) 
• DFID's Human Rights for Poor People (2000) 
 
 
The latter phases in the evolution of rights cover the post-War period and begin with the 1948 
UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights which enshrined the principles of universality, 
inalienability and indivisibility of rights.  Subsequent Conventions and regional Commissions 
extended these principles into more areas of social, political, cultural and economic life.  The 
early goals of the Human Rights movement were drawn out of the horrific experiences of WWII 
and sought to counter the particularistic and exclusionary racial hierarchy that underpinned 
Nazism (Shivji, 1999).  Such challenges to racially-based discrimination chimed with the 
demands of anti-colonial struggles in the Third World so that the human rights agenda was 
supported by these, soon to be, independent states.   
 
Despite the rapid waning of American interest in the rights agenda (Evans 1995), the debates 
were hijacked during the Cold War and used as a means of castigating Communism and 
justifying political, financial and military support for governments who upheld 'proper' rights 
(Slater, 1993; Evans, 1997).  Not surprisingly, this ideologically-charged period saw the 
continued separation of 'political' from 'economic' rights with the former taking precedence in 
this global battle over 'ways of life'.  For newly independent African countries, the priority was 
development so that abstract debates about rights had little relevance to this cohort of 
modernisers who used centralised mechanisms to push through grandiose development plans.  
The result was that the developmental and human rights discourses tended to evolve separately.  
More importantly, perhaps, was the conflict that emerged over the question of 'self-
determination' (Shivji, 1999).  Initially, the right to self-determination was to be all-
encompassing and was clearly an antidote to imperialism in all its guises.  However, during 
negotiations in the mid-1960s over two key Covenants, the interpretation of political self-
determination was reduced to the eradication of formal colonisation (or colonial-type rule such 
as Apartheid) while economic self-determination was equated with the demands for fairer trade 
relations and adequate foreign aid. 
 
The thawing of the Cold War and the ending of Apartheid saw a renewed interest in human 
rights with people emerging from repressive political structures and demanding economic 
development alongside political freedoms.  Such an environment was ripe for the rights-based 
development agenda whose institutional architecture had been developing piecemeal for the 
previous forty years.  Sengupta (2000) believes that a consensus now exists over the value of 
human rights and even suggests that it represents, somewhat ominously, another element in the 
'end of history'.  
 
The rights-based development agenda has risen to prominence in parallel with the emergence of 
social development notions of participation and entitlements that challenged the “technical fix” 
development paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s and the delivery of basic needs in the 1970s. The 
adoption of the 1986 UN Right to Development signalled a unification of the civil and political 
rights with economic, social and cultural rights and a growing political consensus that was 
strengthened through subsequent declarations on Environment and Development (Rio), 
Population and development (Cairo), Social Development (Copenhagen) and the Platform for 
Action of the World Conference on Women at Beijing (Sengupta 2000). The perceived 
indivisibility of rights became increasingly clearly articulated in the development discourse, as 
illustrated by the language adopted during the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration in 
December 1998 and captured in the phrase “All Human Rights for All” (Maxwell, 1999).  
 
Theoretical underpinnings of rights-based development 
 
"the developmentalists are seeking to reformulate their concerns in the language 
of rights, while the human rights advocates are taking on board developmental 
issues without which, they recognise rights-talk can have little meaning to, and 
legitimacy with the vast majority of the people in the poor countries of the South" 
(Shivji, 1999: 262) 
 
The current approach to RBD is iterative and evolutionary in that it learns from and builds upon 
previous approaches.  The move towards RBD has evolved out of the coming together of two 
strands of development theory and practice which had previously been treated as discrete.  On 
the one hand are human development approaches based around dynamic understandings of 
poverty and, on the other, human rights approaches based around questions of governance, 
participation and citizenship.   
 
Dynamic approaches to human development 
In recent years, income or commodity-centred conceptions of well-being have been challenged 
by multifaceted measurements of poverty, such as that underlying the basic needs approach of 
the early 1980s.  Most importantly, from the 1980s, Amartya Sen (1997) conceptualised poverty 
in terms of human capabilities –(resources that give people the capability to be and to act) – and 
entitlements (the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can acquire in any given 
societal context). By so doing he posed fundamental questions about the quality of life beyond 
the possession of commodities; the latter having only “derivative and varying relevance”.  
Speaking to these debates have been discussions of vulnerability.  This is a more dynamic 
concept concerning the changing experiences in socioeconomic status relating to survival, 
exposure to risk, defencelessness and self-respect.  Accordingly, vulnerability captures some of 
the multidimensional, dynamic and structural aspects of poverty:  “Vulnerability denotes not 
simple lack or want, but defencelessness, insecurity and exposure to shock or stress” (Chambers, 
1989: 1).  Whilst vulnerability is not a concept that has been rigorously theorised, or for which 
generally accepted indicators exist, there are a growing number of conceptual frameworks for 
analysing vulnerability, including Moser (1998) and Bebbington (1999) and the livelihoods 
analysis frameworks of DFID (Scoones 1998).  Crucially, this provides policy analysts with 
frameworks for linking entitlements to resources, because they emphasise the structures, 
institutions and processes that mediate individual, household and community-level access to a 
range of assets.  This politicises the vulnerability discourse and creates analytical space for 
tackling  the policy environment and policy making institutions. 
 
Institutions, governance and participation 
This emphasis on institutional processes links directly with debates around governance and 
participation (Mohan and Stokke, 2000).  The key to RBD is that it attaches political rights and 
responsibilities to fundamental aspects of human needs and well-being.  Gaventa and Valderrama 
(1999) usefully draw out this entwining of different interpretations of governance and 
participation.  They see two traditions; one driven by community participation and the other by 
political participation. 
 
The community focused participation is well documented (Chambers, 1983; 1997) and grew out 
of the realisation that formal state-based development programmes had yielded limited benefits.  
Since the 1970s, the acceptance of participation has become widespread, but at its base is a belief 
that development energies lie outside of the state and are built from local knowledge.  It relies on 
relatively closed and homogenising notions of community where participation in decision-
making is direct and unmediated by representatives.  Political participation, on the other hand, 
has focused on more formal engagement with the state by individuals or organised groups and 
parties.  These political processes tend to be less direct than community participation and involve 
elections, lobbying, advocacy and the day-to-day interaction with the local state.  The good 
governance agenda of the 1990s (Leftwich, 1994; Rhodes, 1997) focused centrally on this level 
of participation. 
 
Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) argue that local governance can benefit from the coming 
together of these two traditions through 'citizenship participation' which involves "the direct 
intervention of social agents in public activities" (Cunill, 1997: 77) and has seen renewed interest 
in decentralisation and political culture.  Democratic decentralisation has been a perennial tool in 
development planning since independence, but it holds an important place in RBD, because for 
the majority of the poor the state is the local state (Mamdani, 1996; Migdal, 1994) and it is where 
most citizenship claims will be contested.  On the other hand questions of political culture have 
been re-awakened through debates around social capital.  As the World Bank (1997: 114) notes 
local institutions "are valuable not only for their ability to meet basic needs, but also for the role 
they play in building trust and a sense of public connectedness among those excluded or 
alienated from the formal political process".  So, "there is thought to be a synergistic relationship 
between the emergence of strong civil society and social capital formation" (McIlwaine, 1998: 
418).   
 
The Policy Content of Rights-based Development 
So far we have traced the emergence of RBD and discussed the theoretical ideas underpinning it 
and the political arrangements believed to be necessary to achieve it. The emergence of RBD 
discourse form its intellectual origins in poverty analysis and participation has created an 
operational space for an absorption of the rights agenda within the neo-liberal policy 
frameworks. This is most clearly demonstrated in the transition from the policy analysis in the 
World Bank’s World Development Reports of 1990 and the 2000/01. Both WDRs took poverty 
as their theme, but while the 1990 WDR emphasised labour intensive growth combined with 
investment in human capital, the WDR 200/01 signalled a shift in policy analysis towards a 
concern with “empowerment” through enhanced political participation of poor people in tackling 
institutional “dysfunctionalities”. Even as the ideological climate continues to frame policy 
imperatives of market provision of goods and services and the attendant erosion of the state’s 
redistributive function, the neo-liberal establishment has successfully repositioned itself with 
respect to the rights-based agenda by championing accountability, transparency and the role of 
citizen participation in demanding their rights. 
  
In this section, we look in more detail at the actual policy agenda attached to RBD.  We have 
structured this around different scales and roles for convenience, which reflects a logical division 
of labour between institutional levels although there are clearly inter-linkages between these 
scales and levels.  At the root of RBD is a liberal belief that development is a matter of personal 
choice and effort, but that this is tempered by the prevailing social and political conditions.  It 
also adds a strong action-orientation, in that people now have a claim or entitlement on other 
people and institutions which, if it is socially-accepted or legally-defined, gives people a 
minimum level of expected well-being.  The DFID Report (2000) stresses this 'obligation' as a 
key feature of the new framework which takes us well beyond basic needs approaches which 
were passive and treated the poor as helpless victims.  It also provides limits on the damage that 
individuals should be allowed to bear as a result of externalities generated by other activities, no 
matter how valuable theses activities appear to be.   
 
As we would expect, the key documents are replete with lessons and action items, or in the 
UNDP's vocabulary 'bold new approaches'.  Underpinning DFID's policy agenda is a triumvarate 
of core principles - participation, inclusion and obligation.  These involves (2000: 3): 
• Participation: enabling people to claim their human rights through the promotion of the rights of all citizens 
to participation in, and information relating to, the decision-making processes which affect their lives.  
They acknowledge that action needs to go "beyond and above local-level processes of 
consultation..(and)..linking poor people's perspectives with national and international policy processes" 
(2000: 19); 
• Inclusion: building socially inclusive societies through development which promotes  all human rights for 
all people and encourages everyone to fulfill their duty to the community; 
• Obligation: strengthening state policies and institutions to ensure that obligations to protect and promote all 
human rights are fulfilled. 
 
Overlying these principles are policy items which map onto different political institutions and 
scales.  These can be summarised thus: 
 
International 
The RBD approach takes into account the globalisation of the world economy whereby the 
actions of states beyond their borders is factored into any consideration of rights.  At the 
international level there is a need for commitment, co-operation and co-ordination.  The 
international organisations must be committed across the board to enshrining a RBD approach in 
their operations.  At present, some institutions such as the ILO, UNICEF and UNDP have a 
strong record of incorporating human rights into project design, but others are less stringent on 
this, so the challenge remains to bring all institutions in line and up to speed.  Practical measures 
for assisting policy-makers to mainstream RBD revolve around the understanding and 
measurement of the current state of human rights so that much is made of benchmarking and data 
collection so that decision-makers have a clear picture of how societies are operating with 
respect to human rights.  Another recommendation regards global governance more generally.  In 
response to an on-going critique of the internal democracy of the major institutions the UNDP 
report argues that "all countries - small and weak - have a voice in decisions" (2000: 85).  
International civil society also has a key role in advocacy, monitoring, and consumer pressure.  
Civil society has generally been the motive force behind human rights legislation and its role 
must continue although this is to be in collaboration with states, international organisations, and 
corporations which may further erode the 'independence' of civil society. 
 
After building RBD into project design, the next challenge remains monitoring and enforcement 
of rights abuses.  The UNDP are careful to stress that strengthening the rights-based approach in 
development co-operation must be 'without conditionality'.  The emphasis now is on 'transparent 
and open' economic policy formulation which confers 'ownership' on the implementing country 
and where the final decision rests with elected officials.  There is a recognition that economic 
actors have a role to play in promoting RBD.  The UNDP (2000: iii) begins its report by arguing 
that "Rights makes human beings better economic actors" so that a vibrant economy, while not 
guaranteeing human rights, is a requisite.  The Report goes on to suggest ways in which 
economic growth can be balanced with respect for rights.  Corporations should not use their 
wealth for unfair lobbying and should apply codes of conduct in all their operations while states 
should promote an enabling economic environment which is pro-rights.  The DFID (2000) makes 
similar points, but acknowledges that "(I)t has proved equally difficult to hold transnational 
corporations themselves legally accountable for alleged human rights violations" (14) although 
voluntary codes might be a solution.   
 
National 
The key role in RBD is given over to the state.  The UNDP is at pains to stress that such work 
must go beyond legislation and actively embed the importance of rights in all social norms.  
DFID adds that states are not homogenous entities so that different branches of the state must 
also show commitment, co-operation and collaboration.  The branch which has received most 
attention is the judiciary since it is an impartial and accessible judiciary which can enforce 
human rights.  Such judicial reforms sit alongside those other elements of good governance 
which have become accepted elements of policy reform such as increasing bureaucratic 
accountability and transparency and the holding of competitive elections.  However, the practice 
of democracy must be 'inclusive' and go 'beyond elections' and include minorities and permit an 
active civil society and free press. 
 
Locally 
At the local level the emphasis is on participation, decentralisation and the strengthening of civil 
society to be more rights-oriented.  The onus for this falls on the state to provide "a legal 
framework that protects the right to participation...the need for continual reform to adapt to 
changing circumstances...put in place decision-making processes that are transparent and open to 
dialogue, especially with poor people and poor communities" (UNDP, 2000: 65, 67, & 78).  On 
the other hand civil society must remain vigilant of rights abuses and act as the independent 
monitor.  So, for civil society and NGOs, the emphasis has changed somewhat.  The gradual 
move away from output-based approaches to more process-based ones saw the emphasis shift to 
capacity building of local NGOs and civil society organisations.  With RBD, this has continued, 
but altered somewhat to enable people to use their rights to ensure their well-being.  So NGOs 
become involved in legal and political literacy, and civic leadership (Fowler, 2000).   
Implementing Rights-based Development in Africa 
In this section we outline the implementation of the rights-based development agenda in Africa 
as it currently stands.  This is important in order to understand the problems facing African 
countries in realising a 'universal' project and as a baseline against which to assess the 
desirability and prospects for achieving these goals.  A key tension in the rights debates in Africa 
has been over the timing, balance and importance of political rights on the one hand and ESC 
rights on the other.  Some see democracy as a pre-requisite for any meaningful development, 
which raises questions about whether there are particularly African human rights and 
consequently a specific African democracy (Maluwa, 1997).  Others stress that under extreme 
poverty and marginalisation, it is economic and social rights which are more important, and that 
the operation of imperialism has contributed to this underdevelopment.  As Shivji (1999: 260) 
notes “This is a dilemma which expresses itself in the dichotomy between the so-called 
social/economic rights and political/civil rights on the one hand, and various attempts to 
reconcile the tension by reconceptualising the jurisprudence of rights, on the other”.  The rights-
based development approach contends that such a dichotomy is not useful, because only if 
people are empowered to determine their genuine needs will development occur.  This, they 
contend, simultaneously promotes sustainable democracy and well-being. 
 
The formal rights framework in Africa centres on the 1981 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights which came into force in 1987 alongside the establishment of The African  
Commission of the same name, which is itself a product of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) (Murray, 2000).  As with all regional Charters, it is derived from the 1948 Universal 
Declaration, but takes into account the African experience which saw a greater emphasis on 
economic, cultural and social rights; that is, those which pertain directly to material well-being or 
'development' (Maxwell, 1999; Sano, 2000).  In keeping with the OAU's beliefs and, more 
importantly, the tenets of international law, the Charter and Commission have to recognise the 
primacy of individual states.  As we shall see, debates over the limitations of state-centric legal 
discourses have been paramount given the weak record of accountability of African states and 
other diverse socio-political entitites that co-exist within and alongside formally recognised 
states. 
 
One of the key elements of the African approach to human rights has been to recognise the 
particularity of Africa's experiences within a discourse which stresses the universality of human 
values.  African debates stress the role of 'tradition', colonialism and imperialism in shaping the 
constitution and realisation of human rights (An-Na'im, 1999a).  For example, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights seeks to "eradicate all forms of colonialism from 
Africa..(while taking into consideration)..the values of African civilization" (Murray, 2000: 203). 
 Independence marked, in theory at least, the most important conferral of rights in that people 
became genuine citizens and that their countries were accorded international sovereignty.  
Clearly, the post-independence record of state decay and neo-imperialism have shown the 
limitations of these visions as the mass of Africans have been denied, through no fault of their 
own, some basic aspects of human dignity and social welfare.  
 
A key problem with human rights legislation is that under international law, only states are 
recognised as having 'personality'; that is they are the only formally recognised legal bodies.  So, 
any human rights legislation must be embedded within national political and judicial structures.  
At present the formal policy frameworks for realising RBD are uneven.  It needs re-emphasising 
that much of the RBD agenda is iterative and evolutionary and builds upon the good governance 
and participatory approaches that have become widespread over the past decade.  Hence, many 
of the policy discourses and the institutional architecture already exist.  For example, 
bureaucratic accountability and responsiveness are key elements in RBD, but have clearly been 
on the agenda for a while.  Similarly, gender equality as a central tenet of RBD has been 
contested since the 1970s.  However, current policy stresses certain political and institutional  
innovations.  
 
Some are part of the general human rights processes led by the United Nations.  Since the mid-
1960s there has been various Conventions covering discrimination against key groups (race, 
gender and children) and protection from torture.  Countries sign up to these which indicates a 
willingness to enshrine these principles in law.  The UNDP (2000) reviewed the coverage of 
these signatories which shows that some African countries, such as Cameroon and Zambia, have 
signed and ratified all of the Conventions whereas Ghana has only signed up to the Conventions 
covering racial and gender discrimination while Nigeria has signed up to all except that covering 
torture and degrading treatment.  Other policy channels are largely constitutional and involve 
statements in the constitution or in a separate Bills of Rights.   Maluwa (1997) notes that in 
Southern Africa, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Malawi have fully-fledged Bills of 
Rights.  Most countries' constitutions include some recognition of fundamental human rights 
based, to a large extent, in European and American constitutional practice.  These see a 
separation of legislative and judicial branches of the state and include various mechanisms for 
protecting political freedoms such as freedom of speech and habeas corpus.  However, as An-
Na'im (1999b: 43) notes "None of the countries surveyed provide full-fledged constitutional 
protection for economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights", although, crucially, there is no 
country in the world which does so.  A more recent addition, in the wake of South Africa's Truth 
and Reconcilliation Commission has been the establishement of national Human Rights 
Commissions to monitor the implementation of human rights legislation and disseminate 
information on abuses and best practice (Human Rights Watch, 2001).  Clearly, recognition at 
the Convention, Commission and Treaty level only  stipulates what a state should do and is not a 
good indication of what it actually does. 
 
The record of human rights protection in Africa, in general, and the work of The Commission, in 
particular, has been mixed.  We do not have the space for a detailed account of these experiences 
(see Murray, 2000), but some pertinent points, drawn largely from An Na'im (1999b), are worth 
making.  The first problem is the degree to which African countries respect constitutionalism.  
Many have made important steps in this regard, but often fail to promote economic, social and 
cultural rights and, more importantly, have a range of means to suspend the constitution.  Some 
of these are legal, such as during States of Emergency or through 'claw back clauses', while 
others are less obvious and range from the selection of judges through to outright intimidation.  
A second problem relates to the recognition of customary law within the formal legal system.  
Despite claiming to recognise Africa's uniqueness and diversity, and hence the legitimacy of its 
customary legal practices, these can conflict with universal principles or are simply not taken 
seriously by constitutional lawyers (in part because they are not codified).  In practice, customary 
law usually gives way to statutory or common law.  A third set of problems relate to the judiciary 
and legal profession.  Training is often poor, selection can be politically motivated, and regimes 
tend to circumscribe the independence of the legal profession.  A fourth set of problems relate to 
the international organisations which support human rights promotion on the ground.  The 
African Commission is rather élitist, lacks clear reporting structures, and has unclear authority to 
enforce decisions or condemn violations of human rights (Murray, 2000).  Similarly, many of the 
international NGOs which have been major supporters of human rights causes operate in élitist 
ways (for example, organising urban-based workshops for lawyers) and tend to impose, through 
funding conditionality, their own agendas on local NGOs. 
 
The paradoxes of Rights-based Development in Africa  
The implementation of the rights-based development agenda within the context of existing 
structures of African political economy raises a number of important questions for the future of 
this project.  In this section we highlight some major tensions and contradictions arising out of 
the articulation of a universal political ideal and the realities of territorial states and embedded 
cultural practices. 
 
Sovereignty, conditionality and modernity 
An overarching set of criticisms relates to the broader agenda of RBD and its relationships to 
modernity and western imperialism.  Turner (1993) argues that modernisation involves a 
progressive move from particularism ('tribe', community, ethnicity etc) to universalism and 
secularism.  In this sense, citizenship represents a significant dimension of modernity  whereby it 
initially related to membership of the city-state and later to membership of a nation-state.  A 
possible danger of this reading is that citizenship, as with modernity, becomes equated with the 
suppression of difference and, hence, open to totalising or exclusionary practices.   
 
Furedi (1997) takes development back to the colonial period and the inter-twining discourses of 
stewardship and civilization which legitimised a 'moral intrusion' such that "The right of the 
West to intervene has become a moral imperative" (87).  Since then all manner of interventions 
have ensued leading to the present situation of "Western proprietorship of human rights" (Penna 
and Campbell, 1998: 7).  As with any discourse, the human rights discourse is based on symbols 
which confer meaning, but as Penna and Campbell (1998: 9) note "In human rights discourse, the 
majority of positive symbolism used is Western". A key element of the evolution of rights 
thinking is to treat African (and other 'non-Western') experiences as lacking any relevance for 
'universal' values, thus effecting a form of Eurocentrism which, as we discuss below, can become 
an ideological hammer in the face of cultural difference. 
 
Evans (1997) focuses centrally on the paradoxes of universal human rights discourses and 
sovereignty.  He argues that rights are usually discussed in legal or philosophical terms which 
can mask political and economic interests.  He argues that universal human rights are 'imposed' 
because they offer a "coherent claim to authority over the sovereign state" (91) and "represent a 
further attempt to forge new structures of colonial dominance" (92).  In this sense human rights 
might become a new form of conditionality in dealings between the multilateral institutions and 
recipient countries.  Tensions along these lines were clearly visible at the Rio Earth Summit 
where Southern delegates felt constrained by Western governments bent on protecting their own 
environment and economic growth while disciplining Southern countries into restrictive 
environmental codes.  Similarly, at the Vienna Human Rights Conference a year later, "some 
Asian countries questioned external criticism of their human rights records; in particular, they 
showed their resentment at having imposed on them a set of values based on Western traditions" 
(Potter et al, 1999: 129).   
 
The recent UNDP report (2000: 30) is clearly aware of this issue, but is adamant about such 
responses, 
 
"There is a tension...(B)etween national sovereignty and the international community's 
monitoring of human rights within countries...Many people still see the promotion of 
human rights for some groups..as a threat to their own values or interests.  This 
divisiveness in values breeds opposition to human rights for all" 
 
The implication seems to be that any country who is sceptical about the application of universal 
human rights may well be using this as a defence mechanism for the pursuance of human rights 
abuses.  However, the blanket refusal to countenance detractors from a universal HR approach, 
does smack of 'moral intrusion', and, more importantly, makes it difficult to differentiate between 
a legitimate and illegitimate rejection of universalistic rights.  The emphasis on developing 
regional human rights codes, such as the African Charter, seems one 'best fit' solution which 
balances universality with politico-cultural specificity. 
 
Universalism, cultural relativity and community 
Hence, a key problem is the tension between a universal set of values and a multiplicity of 
embedded local practices (Nagengast and Turner, 1997; Penna and Campbell, 1998).  Debates 
have arisen around the use and abuse of both 'universalism' and 'tradition' since both are tied to 
distinct social and political visions.  As we have seen, the universalist argument can conceal 
western hegemonic aspirations.  On the other hand, the discourse of traditionalism has been used 
by unscrupulous regimes and/or local people to resist external scrutiny and persist with 
inhumane behaviour.  In Africa, this tension has been brought to the fore over such matters as 
female genital mutilation (Penna and Campbell, 1998) and the relationship between customary 
law and common law whereby the latter usually prevails (Murray, 2000).   
 
One of the sources of these problems is in the philosophical inheritance of the rights discourse.  
We saw that the dominant conception of human rights and development are based on liberal 
individualism arising out of The Enlightenment.  However, the alternative to liberalism is some 
form of communitarianism which sees rights shaped by and accountable to a collective (von 
Lieres, 1999).  Talking of Africa, Ake notes "(O)ur people still think largely in terms of 
collective rights and express their commitment to it constantly in their behaviour" (1987: 5).  It 
is, in part, this recognition that the African Charter contains the notion of 'peoples' although 
Murray (2000) has discussed the problems of defining and delimiting 'peoples' and with it the 
whole notion of cultures as bounded and identifiable entities.   
 
The African Charter, like the OAU, upholds the sanctity and integrity of colonially-created 
states, comprised of a multiplicity of 'nations'.  However, in recognising 'peoples', the African 
Charter creates tensions over self-determination.  The first difficulty is that there is no clear 
definition of what constitutes a 'people'.  It is used to refer to the population of a state, although a 
people is not the state itself, but it can be something other than the entire population of the state 
(Murray, 2000).  For example, the African Commission has recognised the Katangese of Congo 
and the Casamance of Senegal as peoples.  The second problem is in interpreting the legitimacy 
of peoples' rights.  If a people feel oppressed by the state, how can they press for self-
determination within the fixity of a territorial nation-state?  Again, this tension has not been 
resolved and the rights discourse in Africa does not countenance full-blown secession, preferring 
instead solutions such as participation, decentralisation, federalism, and proportional ethnic 
representation.  Indeed, most RBD champions such conflict-reducing solutions which retain a 
state-based logic, such as the UNDP's idea of 'inclusive democracy' (UNDP, 2000).  
 
The state, democracy and accountability 
The discussion of freedom and justice at the universal, national, community and individual levels 
raises further questions about the state.  As we have seen, despite the international proclamation 
of universality, the institutions which oversee international law are relatively weak.  This means 
that the onus for defending human rights claims falls largely on states (An-Na'im, 1999a).  So, 
while various multi-levelled mechanisms exist, or have been proposed, the quality of rights 
depends upon the nature of the state in which the rights' claimant exists. 
 
In the African context this clearly creates major problems in using a state-centred rights 
framework for securing development and justice.  As An-Na'im (1999b: 22) observes "(A)frican 
societies appear to regard the post-colonial state with profound mistrust and have no sense of 
ownership of it nor expectation of protection or service from it".  Such a problem is compounded 
when the state is simultaneously the perpetrator of rights' abuses and the institution through 
which grievances should be aired and addressed.  In most cases, then, the state in Africa remains 
a significant generator of human rights abuses as well as holding the key to their protection.  For 
example, the recent report from Human Rights Watch showed that while many regimes have 
established Human Rights Commissions in order to secure donor support they are largely 
ineffective and turn a blind eye to rights abuses (The Guardian, 23rd February 2001).  However, 
states can initiate more positive action as An-Na'im's (1999b) contrasting discussions of Nigeria 
and South Africa highlight. 
 
The Nigerian state has been a flagrant abuser of human rights.  The Constitution contains wide-
ranging derogation (the ability to suspend or repeal) clauses which cover most human rights 
while much of the Constitution was suspended during the Abacha regime by declaring a state of 
emergency.  Additionally, the state has suppressed Shari'a law which can only be tolerated 
where it is compatible with the Constitution. There has also been highly flexible and wide-scale 
abuse of military tribunals which are outside the common law.  The poor pay of judges has 
resulted in them extorting money from litigants in order to get a case to court while human rights 
lawyers have been stigmatised and threatened by the state authorities.  While far from perfect, 
South Africa has been cited as having an innovative and purposeful approach to human rights.  
Not only has South Africa passed a Bill of Rights and set up the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, but it has gone furthest in providing constitutional protection for economic, social 
and cultural rights.  For example, customary law has been made expressly subject to the non-
discrimination provisions of the constitution although the implementation of this remains to be 
contested.  South Africa has also attempted to increase access to the legal system through a re-
structuring of the courts to handle special jurisdictions such as labour and juvenile cases.  They 
have also been at the forefront of experimenting with low-cost delivery of legal services through 
such mechanisms as para-legal extension.   
 
A further, and more general, problem associated with an overly legalistic and state-centred view 
of rights is that certain human rights abuses fall outside of the state's purview and authority.  
Again, this relates to the origin of rights whereby they relate to the 'civil' or 'public' domain 
which, implicitly, meant the political space of men (Assiter, 1999).  The private realm fell 
outside of this discourse yet it has consistently been the site of some of the worst human rights 
abuses.  Clearly, domestic violence against women and the abuse of children are the most 
significant, yet they hold an ambiguous place in the human rights legislation.  Since 1970, the 
existence of CEDAW (The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women) provides a commitment to breaching the public-private divide, yet its forceful 
application in legal systems has been hampered by the feeling that Western feminists have 
hijacked gender and development issues on behalf of 'universal sisterhood' which only serves to 
silence and marginalise the voices of Third World women (Mohanty, 1997).  Additionally, as 
expected, national legal processes, dominated by elite men, have tended to stifle gender 
legislation in the name of its 'un-Africaness'. 
 
The over-reliance on the legal system in securing rights has seen the opening up of 
supplementary practices.  Maxwell (1999) highlights four of these which are echoed in the major 
documents from DFID and UNDP.  First, monitoring at international, national and local levels 
can help create a culture of compliance.  Second, publicity and advocacy help create political 
structures and policy changes in support of rights.  Third, accountability can be created 
administratively by specifying delivery standards through such things as Citizen's Charters.  
Finally, as the DFID were at pains to stress, rights-based approaches can be encouraged by 
broadening participation and giving more people a 'stake' in social decision-making. 
 
Globalisation, liberalisation and structural underdevelopment  
A key debate revolves around the distinction between political and economic rights.  These 
issues have been pre-figured in such debates as those concerning the 'developmental state' 
(Leftwich, 1994) which stresses that economic growth can only be achieved through the 
suppression of rights, the quashing of civil society and the denial of democracy.  On the other 
hand, the 'good governance' agenda, much like the rights agenda, argues that democratic 
participation is not a reward for a harsh economic transition, but is central to any definition and 
process of economic development.  Either way, there is a clear separation between the 'economic' 
and the 'political' which allows states and agencies to focus on one or the other, despite the 
supposed 'indivisibility' of rights.  In general, the human rights discourse has privileged the 
political over the economic with some going further to suggest that this is because the 
recognition of political freedoms is relatively costless compared to economic rights which 
promise tangible material inputs such as housing and health care (Sengupta, 2000).  We shall 
return to this issue below in examining Shivji's (1999) discussion of the right to life. 
 
This in turn means that the discourse of universal rights is relatively mute regarding global 
capitalism as a generator of inequality.  Turner (1993: 2-3) argues that citizenship "is inevitably 
and necessarily bound up with the problem of the unequal distribution of resources" which is in 
keeping with the thrust of RBD.  However, Evans (1997) is more vitriolic about the relations 
between global capitalism and rights.  He argues that by stressing political and civil rights, the 
human rights discourse led by 'the forces of globalization' has sidelined critical discussions about 
economic rights.  So, while international law stresses sovereignty and self-determination, the 
actual operation of dependency denies the realisation of these rights.  He goes on to state that 
"(U)nless political and economic interests are threatened, the economic imperative of 
globalization suggests that victims of rights abuses will be ignored" (Evans, 1997: 98).  There is 
a danger, as with recent discourses of democracy and good governance, that by stressing the 
political realm as distinct from the economic, RBD not only downplays the constraints arising 
from structural inequalities, but does little to address them.  
 
Nowhere is this more clear than in Africa's experience of colonialism and neo-imperialism 
(Maluwa, 1997).  For many, the adjustment era plunged Africa into deeper dependency and more 
polarised poverty.  As Wanyeki (1999: 104) observes, the lack of respect for the rule of law is 
evidenced "by the adoption and implementation of structural adjustment programmes in 
disregard of their impact on human rights".  This paradox could, charitably, be seen as a failure 
of 'joined-up thinking' in global governance, but more realistically it reflects the neo-liberal urge 
to impose marketisation without consideration of its social and political impacts.  The pragmatic 
question which opens up for the development community is whether such anti-imperialist rights 
are achievable in the present climate of neo-liberal globalisation and geopolitical governance?  
 
Some believe a progressive agenda can and should be realised through rights-based social 
provision.  For example, the exercise of human rights by organised labour and the insistence of 
'due process' has enabled unions to make political gains against global capital (Beckman, 
pers.comm.).  This opens up wider debates regarding social policy and globalisation. In the past, 
social policy has been an important means for redistributing resources and ensuring social 
welfare at the level of the nation state.  Deacon (1997) argues that globalising forces have forced 
a 'supranational concern' with social policy upon us even though such thinking is in its 'primitive 
stages'.  In promoting the case for a global social policy, Norton (2000) argues that the freer 
movement of capital between nations, with capital 'regime shopping' for the best conditions, 
encourages governments to lower standards of labour rights and labour protection.  At the same 
time, liberalisation restricts many sources of revenue previously available to fund social 
expenditures (trade tariffs, labour taxes), producing a ‘fiscal squeeze’, while volatility in capital 
flows has been shown to lead, under some conditions, to rapidly developing crises of welfare at 
the regional and national level.  
 
Given these arguments, Norton considers the policy environment to be ripe for change, pointing 
to the multilateral lending institutions increasing engagement in the 1990s with 'classic' social 
policy areas of concern, such as poverty reduction and social protection.  Redistribution between 
countries already operates at the sub-global level through EU mechanisms and Deacon argues 
that such programmes could be expanded into international development, citing the UNDP's 
(1992: 78) argument for a global system of progressive income tax from rich to poor nations.  
 
However, such initiatives are still open to Furedi's accusations of 'moral intrusion'.  Ferguson 
(1999) tackles this head on in acknowledging critiques of benign or progressive globalisation as 
ethnocentric or neo-colonialist.  The rejection of a raft of global social policy principles, argue its 
protagonists, serves the interests of class and gender elites in southern contexts as much as it 
irritates northern governments looking to appease their own constituents.  What is stressed by 
Norton and others is that those with a normative position on social policy principles need to 
create a broad constituency for those principles in the north and south. That means dialogue and 
partnership rather than trying to impose measures through policy conditionality.  The most 
encouraging signs of an emerging social agenda are those that are springing up as truly global 
responses to the challenges of globalisation such as the north-south links underpinning fair trade 
movement and the movement for debt relief. 
 
Citizenship and social welfare 
This emerging debate on global social policy raises further questions regarding what might be 
termed 'thin' citizenship.  Marshall (1964) argued that in Britain rights proceeded from civil 
(legal) in the 17th century, to political (parliamentary democracy) in the 18th and 19th centuries 
to social (welfare state) in the 20th century.  While we can criticise this teleology for presenting a 
too simplistic view of the evolution of rights and for not specifying whether all rights are of 
equal importance, its greatest weakness is in failing to specify the linkages between citizenship 
and capitalism (Turner, 1993).  In particular, citizenship rights might be seen as a radical 
principle of equality or, by providing checks and safety nets, simply a means of promoting 
solidarity and the stability required for further accumulation.  This latter interpretation of rights 
emphasises important concrete entitlements such as housing and clean water, but generates a 
citizen whose political agency is only exercised in pressing for basic needs.  The focus on 
legally-defined welfare provision might preclude alternative trajectories with RBD becoming 
another form of neo-liberal market-led development.  Such a process will be exacerbated with 
such things as GATS (Global Agreement on Trade and Services) which moves control away 
from local people towards global corporations in a mass privatisation of welfare (World 
Development Movement, 2001). 
 
A final paradox of globalisation and rights relates to the relative mobility of capital and the 
control of people (Pettman, 1999).  The twin discursive pillars of globalisation and universal 
human rights suggest that the mobility of finance, goods and ideas is greatly enhanced and 
necessary for continued prosperity while all humans should have the same opportunities and be 
subject to the same rights.  In practice, while certain forms of capital, including some types of 
labour, have become more mobile, states police their borders like never before.  Despite 
pretensions to global citizenship, in beggar-thy-neighbour global capitalism, clear 
differentiations are made between citizens and non-citizens.  So, despite a discourse which 
laments the inevitable waning of state power, states still retain authority to territorially define 
legitimate citizens with valid rights.  Pettman (1999) goes on to suggest that we should press 
states harder to protect rights and expose the myth of powerlessness in the face of globalisation. 
 
Conclusion  
As a creature of liberal individualism, the rights agenda tends to serve the interests of the 
propertied and the powerful.  However, the recent emphasis on economic and developmental 
rights should be welcomed, because it raises the possibility of cementing the right to a decent 
standard of living; even if such commitments remain tentative and uneven.  Clearly, as with any 
ideological venture lead by the major international development agencies, the potential exists for 
the rights-based agenda to be used as a new form of conditionality which usurps national 
sovereignty and thereby further denies the autonomy and freedom which are a sine qua non for  
democratic development.  Additionally, by handing the primary responsibility for defending 
rights to unaccountable and authoritarian states the process does little to challenge the power 
structures which may have precipitated rights' abuses in the first place.  Finally, the emphasis on 
universal rights, as defined through largely Western experiences, limits the relevance of rights to 
local circumstances and thereby effects yet another form of Eurocentric epistemological violence 
which seeks to normalise a particular and self-serving social vision.  Hence, the balance sheet in 
favour of rights-based development, as it is currently conceived, is relatively empty.  So, do we 
simply ignore the RBD agenda or can it be used to effect more meaningful solutions to the 
African crisis of development?  
 
Both Ake (1987) and Shivji (1989, 1999) argue that any discussion of abstract rights pertaining 
to abstract 'humans' is meaningless and unhelpful for Africa and serves only the interests of those 
protagonists who stand to benefit from the status quo.  Shivji (1989: 69) argues that  
 
"human rights-talk should be historically situated and socially specific.   For the African 
perspective this ought to be done frankly without being apologetic.  Any debate 
conducted on the level of moral absolutes or universal humanity is not only fruitless but 
ideologically subversive of the interests of the African masses" 
 
He goes on to assert that any concept of rights in Africa must be anti-imperialist which forces the 
issue of self-determination back on to the agenda and it is, in part, for this reason that he 
welcomes the 'new rights agenda' (Shivji, 1999).  He states  "imperialism is the negation of all 
freedom" so that human rights in Africa "must be thoroughly anti-imperialist, thoroughly 
democratic and unreservedly in the interest of the 'people'" (Shivji, 1989: 70 cited in Penna and 
Campbell, 1998: 11).   
 
Ake (1987) has been equally adamant that any notion of human rights must be grounded in the 
realities of the African crisis.  For him, writing 15 years ago, the spectre of fascism in Africa was 
the paramount political problem so that any articulation of human rights must be "to combat 
social forces which threaten to send us back to barbarism" (1987: 7).  Both authors criticise the 
individualism of bourgeois liberal rights and assert that African societies are far more socially-
oriented so that an African version of human rights must go "beyond the dominant Western 
liberal conception as an individual bearer of rights and include a wide range of more substantive 
contents" (Von Lieres, 1999: 140).    
 
The question remains as to how such a process might be engendered.  Mamdani (1996) 
concludes that more genuine citizenship must acknowledge the bifurcated state and negotiate 
both rights-based and ethnic identities through a "balance between decentralization and 
centralization, participation and representation, autonomy and alliance" (Mamdani, 1996: 298).  
However, beyond that he remains vague.  Von Lieres (1999: 146) also sees multiple democratic 
'spaces' opening up following the retreat of the state, leading to a  
 
"a new dynamic model of interaction between multiple, often interdependent socio-
political and cultural spaces and groups..(moving us away)..from the idea of the citizen as 
a bearer of rights towards the idea of the citizen as participant and claimant, embedded in 
a series of networks guaranteeing inclusion and preventing marginalization from wider 
social and political processes" (Von Lieres, 1999:146) 
 
While she may be right to describe the African political imagination as 'survivalist', such a view 
of political inclusion remains rather voluntaristic and denies the possibility that, in an 
environment of poverty and political turmoil, the 'new spaces' might be filled by warlords, 
gangsters and other anti-democratic factions. 
 
Both Ake and Shivji also posit alliances between diverse political communities as one means of 
pressing for meaningful rights.  Indeed, Ake's strategic realpolitik leads him to argue, despite his 
general scepticism towards liberal rights, that we need "a coalition of all those who value 
democracy not in the procedural liberal sense but in the concrete socialist sense.  This is where 
the idea of human rights comes in.  It is easily the best ideological framework for such a 
coalition" (1987: 8).  Ake rightly acknowledges that any realisation of such rights will involve 
struggle such that empowerment cannot be handed down by development agencies or the state, 
but must be taken by the marginalised.  Instead, we will see "a protracted and bitter struggle 
because those who are favoured by the existing distribution of power will resist heartily" (1987: 
11).  As a result, he is somewhat dismissive of any institutional or procedural reforms of the type 
imagined in the RBD agenda (Maluwa, 1997). 
 
Shivji (1999) is more positive about the potential role of legislation in securing a rights-based 
approach to development.  In keeping with the RBD agenda he believes productive gains can be 
made by bringing together the developmental and human rights traditions.  To support his case 
he examines the successes of 'social action litigation' (SAL) in India which has pushed for social 
justice as opposed to the individualistic 'natural' justice enshrined in liberal rights discourses.  
SAL has questioned the issue of what it means to live and broadened it to include a range of 
rights not normally considered justiciable.  In particular, a person not directly affected by an 
abuse of rights can still bring a petition to court if they feel that basic rights to live have been 
violated.  And by expanding the notion of what it means 'to live' to include a right to work, the 
dichotomy between political and ESC rights is breached.  Shivji uses this to press for a new 
rights regime which asserts that a right to life is the most fundamental human right.  However, 
unlike liberal conceptions, it accepts that 'living' involves being part of a wider collective which 
may be anything from a family, community organisation or trade union.   
 
Allied to this is this right to self-determination which applies in two senses.  First, to nations 
within the uneven global political-economy.  This marks his approach out as more 
transformatory and radical than the current RBD approaches which see all nation-states as equals 
which covertly denies the unequal use of power by some states and TNCs.  Second, self-
determination applies to minorities or 'nations' existing within the borders of accepted nation-
states.  This is not simply about recognition of these groups, but about allowing them "to 
determine their 'self' politically in terms of participating in major decision-making processes that 
affect their lives" (1999: 269).  In this regard, Shivji is welcoming of the African Charter's 
inclusion of 'people's' rights, so long as these are taken seriously. 
  
Such efforts can justifiably be dismissed as drops in the ocean which will not effect major social 
transformation.  While individual victories in favour of the oppressed and marginalised may have 
limited impact, the broader process keeps alive the debate about the limitations of existing 
political structures to deliver development while simultaneously giving credibility to those 
organised activities aimed at transforming livelihoods and discrediting those who oppose such 
activities. So, we do not believe that the rights-based development agenda, as currently 
constructed, will challenge the structures which create underdevelopment.  Only by embedding 
discussions in the locally meaningful struggles that confront impoverished Africans and by 
promoting broader and direct participation which, crucially, promotes self-determination can  a 
rights agenda more thoroughly promote African development. 
 
Giles Mohan is in the Department of Geography, University of Portsmouth and Jeremy Holland 
 is in the Centre for Development Studies, University of Swansea. 
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